In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 247-248 [Access article in PDF] Christ and Buddha: Weaving a Path for the New Millennium Thomas G. Hand, S.J.Mercy Center, Burlingame, CAThis dialogue conference/retreat was held at Mercy Center, Burlingame, CA, August 10-15, 1999. Well over the stated limit of 150 people joined a faculty of ten in presentations, discussions, sharing, meditation, and rituals. The conference was born primarily out of the personal (...) and social need for dialogue felt by Sandi Peters, who joined the program staff of Mercy Center after three years spent at Insight Meditation East, Barre, Massachusetts.Besides Peters as presider, the faculty members were: representing the Buddhist side--Nigel Edmonds (Mahayana and Christianity), Chris Phillips (Theravada), Ven. Thubten Chodron (Vajrayana), Rev. Heng Sure (Chinese Mahayana), and Patrick Thornton (Theravada and Christianity); representing the Christian side--Thomas G. Hand, S. J. (Catholic), Kevin Hunt, OCSO (Cistercian monk), Roshi Jinne Richardson (Zen and Christianity), and Rev. Shari Young (Episcopal and Zen).In a well-received keynote talk, Thomas Hand offered as the basis for the whole dialogue "The Primacy of Experience" in both traditions. The major themes were: (1st day) "The Challenges of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," (2nd day) "The Language and Symbols of the Traditions," (4th day) "Weaving a Path for the New Millennium" as a joint venture of the two traditions together. On the third day, participants engaged in "Practice--East and West," including presentations geared toward practice both then and there and in the future.One marked difference between this conference and those that Mercy Center put on from 1985 to 1988 was the quality of the participants. In the earlier conferences, many were seekers and intellectual questioners. This year, besides such qualities, the participants were sincere practitioners. In fact, a great many were practicing in both traditions. They often classified themselves as Buddhist Christians or as Christian-root Buddhists. The greater depth of dialogue that has developed in less than fifteen years was clearly apparent. What is more, the sharing and insights of both Buddhist and Christian presenters seemed to have become increasingly relaxed, articulate, and vital. Their presentations were met with much deeper understanding and enthusiasm by all the participants. [End Page 247]Besides the presentations, participants deeply appreciated the chi kong and tai chi sessions, the daily meditation together, the day of practice, the tea ceremony, and the closing ritual. In a word, the conference was holistic dialogue.Those of dual practice were especially happy to find that they are not alone, that many are coming together to weave a new Path for the new millennium.Tapes are available. Contact Sandi Peters at (650) 340-7486.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas G. Pavel INCOMPLETE WORLDS, RITUAL EMOTIONS' IN recent years, the notion of "fictional world" has enjoyed a considerable rise in fortune. The expression, however, is not entirely new. To refer to the world of a literary work, of a novel or of a play, has always been a favorite way of speaking for literary critics and aestheticians. In most cases, these were informal worlds. A discussion of (...) the world of Balzac, Dostoyevsky, HenryJames, or Proust often amounts to a description of each author's preferences in die selection and rearrangement of his material. Such discussion primarily fits authors who purposefully attempt to build comprehensive representational artifacts. One speaks quite naturally about l'univers balzacien, or about the universe of Musil. But is one entitled to refer with equal ease to the world ofBenjamin Constant, meagerly perceptible in his Adolphe, a short novel built in the spirit of economy, displaying just a few characters and a minimum of worldly information? Perhaps density and comprehensiveness are not indispensable characteristics of literary worlds. Aestheticians and narratologists using the "fictional worlds" terminology seem to believe mat any kind of artistic text projects a world, be it rich or poor. Such worlds are imagined in the fashion of modern philosophy of logic as states of affairs, more or less comprehensive. Some writers believe that the states of affairs comprised in fictional worlds must be fairly sizable, since diey should include "not only what the author indicates, but also whatever is required (entailed) by that which he indicates." 1 The laws of nature which are not specifically contradicted by the text would belong to its world. Thus, a few notorious cases aside, there is no reason to doubt that every child born in fiction has been engendered by a human fadier as long as the text does not report an exception. And if it does? Then, assuming that the laws of logic still govern if not fiction itself at least our understanding of it, we may appeal to what "possible world" philosophers have called "small miracles." * Editor's note: This article, as well as the contributions by Gerald Prince, Peter van Inwagen, and Kendall Walton which follow it, grew out ofa symposium on "Styles ofFictionality," organized by Professor Pavel and held at Harvard University in 1981. The Fall, 1983 issue of PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE will contain additional papers presented at the symposium. 48 Thomas G. Pavel49 Imagine, for instance, the world in which Notre Dame de Paris would be covered with blue paint. While everything else would preserve the properties it possesses in the actual world, with the laws of nature and the caused chains maintained, a small local change, somewhat miraculous, would modify only the color of the venerable building. Similarly, the world of Balzac may be understood as the world of early and mid-nineteenth-century France, slightly modified by the addition of a few hundred imagined characters. That diese conform surprisingly well to the general laws of French society of the time is so much the goal of Balzac's successful project, that for the sociologically-minded reader die' actual nonexistence of Rastignac, Rubempré, Vautrin, or Birotteau may appear a mere accident. These characters, one may surmise, display every trait that actual counterparts of theirs would possess, except existence. Hence, why would Rastignac's or Vautrin's emergence in a world omerwise identical to nineteenth-century France amount to anydiing more than a "small miracle"? On the other hand, Balzac's world being blessed wim hundreds of such miracles, the very magnitude of the project vindicates the attribute of "visionary," ascribed to Balzac by Béguin, or, if metaphorically undercut, mat of"God the Father" given him by Thibaudet. For, would not such magnitude entail more than just local changes in an otherwise faithful representation of the "actual" nineteenthcentury France? Similarly, would we interpret a fictional world in which a child has been engendered not by a human father, but by a divinity, as identical in all respects to the actual world, except for the limited modification attributed to a small miracle? 2 If we grant for a moment the improbable assumption that nineteenth-century France was a given and that Balzac... (shrink)

Current work in experimental biology revolves around a handful of animal species. Studying only a few organisms limits science to the answers that those organisms can provide. Nature has given us an overwhelming diversity of animals to study, and recent technological advances have greatly accelerated the ability to generate genetic and genomic tools to develop model organisms for research on host–microbe interactions. With the help of such models the authors therefore hope to construct a more complete picture of the mechanisms (...) that underlie crucial interactions in a given metaorganism (entity consisting of a eukaryotic host with all its associated microbial partners). As reviewed here, new knowledge of the diversity of host–microbe interactions found across the animal kingdom will provide new insights into how animals develop, evolve, and succumb to the disease. (shrink)

Modern thinkers long have been troubled by everyday talk. For example, one nineteenth-century Tory critic observes, “General small-talk” is any exchange “in mixed society, where men and women, young and old, wise and foolish, are all mingled together.” However available the occasion or obvious the topics, chatting is easy for the talented but awkward for the ungifted. On the other hand, “special, or professional small talk” is an exchange of words between persons of “the same mode of life, as (...) between two apothecaries, two dissenters, two lawyers, two beggars, two reviewers, two butlers, two statements, two thieves, &c.&c.&c.; in short all conversations which are tinctured with the art, craft, mystery, occupation... (shrink)

Volume 2 covers one of the richest eras for the philosophical study of religion. Covering the period from the 6th century to the Renaissance, this volume shows how Christian, Islamic and Jewish thinkers explicated and defended their religious faith in light of the philosophical traditions they inherited from the ancient Greeks and Romans. The enterprise of 'faith seeking understanding', as it was dubbed by the medievals themselves, emerges as a vibrant encounter between - and a complex synthesis of - the (...) Platonic, Aristotelian and Hellenistic traditions of antiquity on the one hand, and the scholastic and monastic religious schools of the medieval West, on the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetoric, Reflection, and Emancipation: Farrell and Habermas on the Critical Studies of CommunicationG. Thomas GoodnightThere are moments in history that appear to be alive with emancipatory possibilities. Such were the years moving toward the end of the long twentieth century. In spring 1989, students protested the communist regime in China; the Tiananmen Square massacre initiated an episode of opposition and commenced China’s modern journey toward global reengagement. Revolutions (...) in Europe that autumn were more peaceful. On August 23 two million Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian citizens held hands and announced the Baltic Way as a departure from Soviet rule. Transitions rapidly followed in Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany, culminating in the Velvet Revolution where on November 17 student protests were beaten back by police in Prague only to be followed three days later by an assembly of 200,000 demanding the transfer of power from the Communist Party. On December 3, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev jointly announced an imminent end to the fifty-year-old Cold War. During this time of hopeful transition, two scholars were at work refiguring the philosophical mission of the Frankfurt school, transforming critique from its early totalizing posture into the critical study of communication.Thomas B. Farrell and Jürgen Habermas were trained in different traditions but adjacent disciplines, communication and sociology. Their works [End Page 421] share a commitment to philosophical inquiry directed toward critique and understanding the cultural, social, and linguistic constitution of communication. As a rhetorician and as a philosopher, these scholars share an evident passion for scholarly argument and for engagement with the controversies of public culture. In different ways, both were at work during the portentous years of transition from the Cold War to new democracies and incipient globalization. Each constructed a guarded program of hope in the possibilities of communicative reflection and reasoning. In the post-World War II era, such a broad, positive vision took long to develop. After the brutal realities of the Holocaust became publicly known in the late 1940s, “the generous faith in rationality and the possibilities of human progress which underlay much of earlier historical thought seems discredited today” (Katznelson 2003, 2). The Enlightenment possibilities for reason had been invested in the technical efficiency of modern institutions that produced the capacity to kill systematically without constraints. Ira Katznelson points to a generation of scholars—including individuals at Chicago, Columbia, the New School, and others—who began in the 1950s to engage in a project that would “shade the Enlightenment’s philosophical anthropology, thicken its defenses against evil, deepen its capacity to reason, and restore” an Enlightenment more critical and less susceptible to co-optation by the excesses of nationalism, ideology, and evil (2003, 2). The work of Farrell and Habermas belongs to the extended post-Holocaust moment, where the possibilities of reflective reason in ethical and moral deliberations were set carefully on a road to personal and collective emancipation.Max Horkheimer saw in the modern, postwar welfare state little reason for optimism. Writing in 1946 at the beginning of the Cold War, he concluded: “Language has been reduced to just another tool in the gigantic apparatus of production in modern society” (1974, 22). “Salestalk” by “the surrogates of culture” creates an “illusory triumph of democratic progress that consumes the intellectual substance on which democracy has lived” (Horkheimer 1974, 31). Scientifically engineered propaganda renders public opinion as “a substitute for reason.” With such tools, the forces of barbarism are always waiting in the wings to seize power. Early on, Habermas shared these views. His thesis, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989a), tracks the opening possibilities of communicative reasoning in the liminal spaces of eighteenth-century coffeehouses where frank talk replaced hierarchically driven politeness, the development of these talks into the practices of deliberative democracy, and the decline of deliberative democracy with the union of the state and mass media in producing spectacles in [End Page 422] support of rituals of legitimation. Habermas broke with Horkheimer over the dissertation, however. A thesis of decline, by itself, leaves open only the route of totalizing critique. While never far from critique of institutional practices, Habermas spent his career in opening a positive... (shrink)

Protecting the privacy of individually-identifiable health data and promoting the public’s health often seem at odds. Privacy advocates consistently seek to limit the acquisition, use, and disclosure of identifiable health information in governmental and private sector settings. Their concerns relate to misuses or wrongful disclosures of sensitive health data that can lead to discrimination and stigmatization against individuals. Public health practitioners, on the other hand, seek regular, ongoing access to and use of identifiable health information to accomplish important public (...) health objectives. The collection and use of identifiable health data by federal, tribal, state, and local health authorities support nearly all public health functions and goals.Identifiable health data are the lifeblood of public health practice. When aggregated, these data help authorities monitor the incidence, patterns, and trends of injury and disease in populations. Health data are acquired by public health authorities through testing, screening, and treatment programs. (shrink)

The emergence of new obstetrical and neonatal technologies, as well as more aggressive clinical management, has significantly improved the survival of extremely low birth weight infants. This development has heightened concerns about the limits of viability. ELBW infants, weighing less than 1,000 grams and no larger than the palm of one's hand, are often described as of late twentieth century technology. Improved survivability of ELBW infants has provided opportunities for long-term follow-up. Information on their physical and emotional development contributes (...) to developing standards of practice regarding their care. (shrink)

Politics is rife with motivated cognition. People do not dispassionately engage with the evidence when they form political beliefs; they interpret it selectively, generating justifications for their desired conclusions and reasons why contrary evidence should be ignored. Moreover, research shows that epistemic ability (e.g. intelligence and familiarity with evidence) is correlated with motivated cognition. Bjørn Hallsson has pointed out that this raises a puzzle for the epistemology of disagreement. On the one hand, we typically think that epistemic ability in (...) an interlocutor gives us reason to downgrade our belief upon learning that we disagree. On the other hand, if our interlocutor is under the sway of motivated cognition, then we have reason to discount his opinion. In this paper, I argue that Hallsson's puzzle is solved by adopting a Bayesian approach to disagreement. If an interlocutor is under the sway of motivated cognition, his disagreement should not affect our beliefs--no matter his ability. Because we implicitly and to high accuracy know his beliefs before he reveals them to us, disagreement provides us with no new information on which to conditionalize. I advance a model which accommodates the motivated cognition dynamic and other key epistemic features of disagreement. (shrink)

The article compares different models of bioethics. The dominant model considers bioethics as just a new area of applied ethics focusing in its origin mainly on questions of medical ethics like those rising from reproductive medicine. Within the framework of this concept, the formal application of ethical principles on medical practices is normally understood as a strategy for the preservation of personal autonomy of the individual. Another model linked e.g. to the names of Van Rensselaer Potter or Hans Jonas can (...) be called a "holistic" one and refers to ethical issues discussed within the greater context of "general meditation" of life in general, nature and human life-worlds. Holistic bioethics focuses on the idea of integrity, and it also allows an internal "living" pluralism of perspectives, which corresponds to the self-differentiation of life in a plurality of life-worlds. The third model is an integrative bioethics which not only tries to combine the perspectives of autonomy on the one hand, life and nature as a whole on the other, but also shows that bioethics is founded on its own sources of normativity. From these sources also rises its task of “integrating” the perspectives of different scientific disciplines on issues of life in general. The concept of "integrative bioethics" is promoted in the article because of the following characteristics: integrative bioethics considers all kinds of interaction between autonomous persons, living beings and nature in general; it is transdisciplinary and therefore based on a dialogue of all sciences in which bioethical awareness of the problem may arise; it is open also to non-scientific manifestations of individual and social consciousness and therefore in discussing live in a normative sense nevertheless stays in contact with the real life-worlds of real people. At the end of the article integrative bioethics is discussed with regard to the example of the meaning of the idea of a “natural will”. (shrink)

The article compares different models of bioethics. The dominant model considers bioethics as just a new area of applied ethics focusing in its origin mainly on questions of medical ethics like those rising from reproductive medicine. Within the framework of this concept, the formal application of ethical principles on medical practices is normally understood as a strategy for the preservation of personal autonomy of the individual. Another model linked e.g. to the names of Van Rensselaer Potter or Hans Jonas can (...) be called a "holistic" one and refers to ethical issues discussed within the greater context of "general meditation" of life in general, nature and human life-worlds. Holistic bioethics focuses on the idea of integrity, and it also allows an internal "living" pluralism of perspectives, which corresponds to the self-differentiation of life in a plurality of life-worlds. The third model is an integrative bioethics which not only tries to combine the perspectives of autonomy on the one hand, life and nature as a whole on the other, but also shows that bioethics is founded on its own sources of normativity. From these sources also rises its task of “integrating” the perspectives of different scientific disciplines on issues of life in general. The concept of "integrative bioethics" is promoted in the article because of the following characteristics: integrative bioethics considers all kinds of interaction between autonomous persons, living beings and nature in general; it is transdisciplinary and therefore based on a dialogue of all sciences in which bioethical awareness of the problem may arise; it is open also to non-scientific manifestations of individual and social consciousness and therefore in discussing live in a normative sense nevertheless stays in contact with the real life-worlds of real people. At the end of the article integrative bioethics is discussed with regard to the example of the meaning of the idea of a “natural will”. (shrink)

Through a critical analysis of the work of Henry Davis, S.J. and Francis, C.SS.R., this study examines the Catholic tradition in respect to the moral responsibilities of physicians. It first reviews the historical formation of the manuals of moral theology in order to historically situate Davis and Connell in the twentieth century. The study then examines the work of Davis and Connell in light of David Kelly's The Emergence of Roman Catholic Medical Ethics in North America, wherein he posits a (...) shift in moral methodology in 1940 from physicalism to ecclesiastical positivism. Contrary to Kelly's thesis, this study finds essentially no methodological difference between Davis' commandment-centered methodology and Connell's virtue-centered method. In actuality, both theologians throughout their careers focused upon the physical nature of the action and employed the traditional principles of double effect and cooperation when determining the morality of an intrinsically evil act. ;Through a comparison of the work of Davis and Connell, the study concludes with a description of the moral responsibilities of physicians for a contemporary practice of medicine. These duties include basic responsibilities, social responsibilities and the responsibilities to the dying patient. (shrink)

Scholars Karl R. Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn developed new frameworks that helped shape practical science policies and contributed to a greater understanding of the power and limitations of science. Popper did not accept induction as a method of arriving at scientific conclusions and rejected the justification of scientific theories and hypotheses. On the other hand, Kuhn advocated the progress of science and accepted some principles of scientific practices, including law, theory, instrumentation and application. -/- .

In this essay I will examine the changing historical relationship between two fundamentally modern concepts: self-preservation and self-ownership. These two concepts have served a dual function in modernity. On the one hand, they are crucial parts of the theoretical underpinning of liberalism: the natural law of self-preservation is the foundation of the rational inclination to form civil society (e.g., Hobbes); and self-ownership provides the foundation for the liberal (i.e., Lockean) notion of private property. But on the other hand, (...) these two concepts serve much more than a theoretical purpose; they also perform a duty in what I would like to call, borrowing Foucault's phrase, a modern technology of the self. At this level, the concepts of self-ownership and self-preservation shape individuals to follow certain routines in their behavior, to treat their bodies in specific ways, to organize their time in a particular fashion. In performing these routines, individuals participate in the collection and dissemination of that knowledge of individual bodies and groups of bodies which, as Foucault and Arendt in their different ways revealed, is endemic to modernity. (shrink)

More than a decade after Philip P. Wiener and Frederick H. Young edited the first volume of Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, Moore and Robin have brought together a collection of essays which serves as a valuable supplement to that earlier publication. It is more than a supplement, however; it can stand on its own as a significant contribution to Peirce scholarship. Continuity with the first volume is achieved through new essays which analyze Peirce's theory of belief, (...) of habit, and of Scotistic realism—themes about which many of the earlier papers revolved. Novelty is achieved through increased emphasis on Peirce's logical and mathematical writings and on the influence of nineteenth century evolutionism upon Peirce's pragmaticism. The exploration of the latter motif in the three contributions of W. Donald Oliver, Rulon Wells, and Thomas A. Goudge is particularly noteworthy. In their Preface, Moore and Robin state that the most significant contribution of this new volume is the revelation of the extent to which Peirce was first a scientist and then a philosopher. This is a misleading characterization of the book. True, Victor F. Lenzen's "Charles S. Peirce As Astronomer" is an engaging piece. On the other hand, the bulk of the articles impress the reader with the originality and modernity of Peirce, the philosopher and Peirce, the logician. The most notable feature of this collection is the number of essays which draw parallels between dominant philosophical and logical themes found in Peirce's writings and major interests of mid-twentieth century philosophers. Impressive examples are: A. R. Turquette's "Peirce's Icons For Deductive Logic," Richard M. Martin's "On Acting On A Belief," Larry Holmes's "Prolegomena To Peirce's Philosophy Of Mind," and Richard J. Bernstein's "Peirce's Theory of Perception." In presenting the articles which constitute this volume the editors give evidence not only of the relevance of Peirce for the contemporary student of philosophy but also of the impetus which Peirce's thought has provided for creative philosophical analysis. An additional bonus for Peirce scholars are two bibliographies prepared by Max H. Fisch. One is a supplement to Arthur W. Burk's 1958 bibliography of works by C. S. Peirce. The other is a draft of a bibliography of works about C. S. Peirce.—B. G. R. (shrink)

We recognize today's deep neural network (DNN) models of language behaviors as engineering achievements. However, what we know intuitively and scientifically about language shows that what DNNs are and how they are trained on bare texts, makes them poor models of mind and brain for language organization, as it interacts with infant biology, maturation, experience, unique principles, and natural law.

Quine takes physics to be the ultimate arbiter of what there is. [AL 1/29/2004].

1. Bosanquet, who relished paradox, does not disappoint us about history. The late nineteenth century was a golden age of historical inquiry. Historians — Ernst Curtius, J.G. Droysen, Theodor Mommsen in Germany, William Stubbs, E.A. Freeman and F.W. Maitland in England, Jules Michelet and others in France — were establishing history as a credible and esteemed academic discipline. This increasing respectability of the practice of history was matched by a sophisticated theorisation of history, a theorisation which took two directions. On (...) the one hand were Marx’s brilliant and bewitching historical projections. On the other the logic and methodology of history as an autonomously valid form of knowledge and inquiry were being elaborated. This last was largely a process in which the hermeneutic inquiries of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Droysen and Wilhelm von Humboldt came to fruition in the work of such writers as Philip August Boeckh, Wilhelm Dilthey and — not to forget The Presuppositions of Critical History — our own F.H. Bradley. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.4 (2003) 376-379 [Access article in PDF] Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Jeffrey Walker. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 396. $65.00, cloth. According to Jeffrey Walker, poetry is among rhetoric's true progenitors. Rhetoric was derived, he argues, not from the usual and oft told forensic or political sources but from an ancient argumentative mode that came to be known as epideictic and (...) that, long before Aristotle, included poetry. For Walker, this ur-epideictic was a broadly considered practice of artfully composed persuasive discourse: epideiktikon, "the rhetoric of belief and desire," as opposed to pragmatikon, "the rhetoric of practical civic business" (10). The former is primary and existed ages before rhetoric itself had a name; the latter is secondary because it depends upon and appeals to the beliefs and desires cultivated by the former. Recent discussions, as this well documented work suggests, have prepared us for a reconsideration of rhetoric's origin, perhaps even such a drastic one as this book proposes. Walker's aims, however, are not confined to revising rhetoric's history.The import of his thesis goes several steps farther to reflect his dismay with modern poetic practice and its underlying educational tradition. In that dismay, Walker's work passes beyond the revisionary and turns toward the subversive and polemic. This turn is seen best not in his thesis but in his hypothesis, his "plot": "the dominant notions of 'poetry' and 'rhetoric' that modern culture has inherited—and its notions of 'poetry' in particular—are largely products of the grammatical tradition in late antiquity" (311), a tradition which has proved stifling.In sum, Walker seeks not simply to revise history but also to adjust our educational and critical ideas and, above all, to improve the practice of poetry. In attempting briefly to set forth his thesis and hypothesis, I have surely misrepresented his manner. His stance is not exactly confrontational, although in the ultimate reckoning the reader will find that Walker pulls no punches about his aims. Revisionary, to an extent subversive, and at least somewhat polemical if not exactly confrontational—all adjectives fit, as I shall show in a review that, as I say, may regretfully damage Walker's rhetorical skills by making his case seem simpler, plainer, and far less interesting [End Page 376] than in fact it is. Indeed Walker's own skill as a rhetorician is particularly gratifying and persuasive. It's always gratifying and persuasive to find a rhetorical specialist who is adept at communication, relaxed in controversy, crafty in his use of figures (e.g., Isocrates's "Henry-Jamesian periods," 177), and sharp in his knowledge of literature.Walker's argument proceeds seamlessly and smoothly, as if offering only a kind of alternate to the usual view of our intellectual history: the nature of neither rhetoric nor poetry need be confused with the politics and taste that have necessarily driven the fortunes of each. After a brief excursus into comparative rhetoric (13-14), Walker turns his attention toward another kind of diversity, or lack thereof: the confining theoretical and critical sameness that has prevailed in our Western attitudes toward rhetoric and poetry since their ancient appearance as "conceptualized discursive practices" (17). Again, Walker's alternate to the usual view emerges as a kind of rancor-free "on the other hand" stance, or more in line with his own terminology, as the sort of tactic that from the time of the sophists has been known as making the lesser case the stronger. Nonetheless, the shortcomings of the traditionally dominant case grow exponentially until finally, as Walker's argument turns to near-polemic, they become shackles on the nature of the two arts.Crucial to his thesis is his presentation of the enthymeme. Here, more than in his discussion of epideictic, is the linchpin of his argument. At first he adverts to rhetoric as a Ciceronian combination of wisdom and eloquence or as a Quintilianesque ideal of wisdom speaking copiously, two venerable, widely accepted, perhaps even common-ground definitions that (like his idea of the epideictic) allow strategically for considerable... (shrink)

We show that certain classes of modules have universal models with respect to pure embeddings: Let R be a ring, T a first‐order theory with an infinite model extending the theory of R‐modules and (where ⩽pp stands for “pure submodule”). Assume has the joint embedding and amalgamation properties. If or, then has a universal model of cardinality λ. As a special case, we get a recent result of Shelah [28, 1.2] concerning the existence of universal reduced torsion‐free abelian groups with (...) respect to pure embeddings.We begin the study of limit models for classes of R‐modules with joint embedding and amalgamation. We show that limit models with chains of long cofinality are pure‐injective and we characterize limit models with chains of countable cofinality. This can be used to answer [18, Question 4.25].As this paper is aimed at model theorists and algebraists an effort was made to provide the background for both. (shrink)

As etiologic concepts of diseases gradually changed from humoral to microbial in the 19th century, syphilis presented particularly great challenges to doctors and scientists. Was “syphilis” merely a synonym for “venereal disease,” and did all manifestations attributed to it have the same cause? The discovery in 1879 of the gonococcus by Albert L. Neisser , and of the cause of chancroid, or soft chancre, in 1890 by Augusto Ducrey , established that venereal disease and syphilis were not synonymous, but syphilis (...) continued to mystify investigators. Symptoms could disappear for years and then—in most but not all persons—reappear with entirely different “tertiary” manifestations. .. (shrink)

As fundamental researchers in the neuroethology of efference copy, we were stimulated by Grush's bold and original synthesis. In the following critique, we draw attention to ways in which it might be tested in the future, we point out an avoidable conceptual error concerning emulation that Grush seems to share with other workers in the field, and we raise questions about the neural correlates of Grush's schemata that might be probed by neurophysiologists.

The ability to effectively prevent smallpox was the greatest medical accomplishment of the first half of the 19th century. From 1838 to 1840, half a century after vaccination was introduced but before it became mandatory in England, data about the general population of England and Wales recorded 70 deaths per million from smallpox; only 180, 900 vaccinations were recorded. In London alone from 1848 to 1852, there were 4, 858 youthful deaths from smallpox, 67% of which occurred during the first (...) five years of life (Simon 1857).In a report to the House of Commons in 1802, Edward Jenner (1749-1823) stated that person-to-person vaccination was a basic principle of his procedure. He gained confidence in it from the case .. (shrink)

Reality is two-fold, composed of the lighted world as revealed in Genesis, and the darker primordiality which preceded it. The illuminated represents that which the human mind can comprehend, manipulate and re-order to its will: a “designed” and mechanical universe of parts. But behind it, in the backspace of reality, remains the darkness. A formless state of pre-creation, the darkness exists as an endless series of intertwining “signatures” – single possibilities waiting to be created in the illuminated forefront of reality. (...) Permitting each and every part of the lighted world to be connected to the rest, it possesses a “design” all of its own. The question is, if we are blind in the dark, how could we ever come to know it? (shrink)

Life is a battlefield onto which we are thrown at birth, with only fate and fortune settling upon where we land. Wherever we land, whether it's on the front lines or surrounded by a network of defenses, we are all asking the same question: why are we here? The problem with this question, however, is that we tend to answer it from our own relative positions, and so we all arrive at different conclusions. The many answers we've created have filled (...) the field. They have become banners that are raised high so that we can see and follow them. These banners are always at risk of being toppled though; always at risk of losing their capacity for belief. But then, what if belief is more than a mere by-product of our universal search? What if belief can change the very fabric of this field? That is, what if truth is actually irrelevant, and the only real thing that makes up this battlefield is the belief, and consequently the collective will, which we invest in our answers? (shrink)

Why and how have supply chain codes of conduct diffused among lead firms around the globe? Prior research has drawn on both institutional and stakeholder theories to explain the adoption of codes, but no study has modeled adoption as a temporally dynamic process of diffusion. We propose that the drivers of adoption shift over time, from exclusively nonmarket to eventually market-based mechanisms as well. In an analysis of an original data set of more than 1,800 firms between the years 2006 (...) and 2015, we find that strong nonmarket labor institutions in a firm’s home country are critical to initiating and sustaining the diffusion process. Market mechanisms, such as investor scrutiny and brand risk, emerge as important later. Contrary to prior research, we did not find a significant effect from nongovernmental organization (NGO) pressure. We conclude that markets for corporate social responsibility can and do arise, but only after they are effectuated by nonmarket institutions. (shrink)